Economic incentives created by the commodity programs are hypothesized to cause program participants to apply agrichemicals at greater rates than nonparticipants. Corn producers who participate in the USDA feedgrain program are shown to apply nitrogen, herbicides, and insecticides at statistically greater rates than those who do not participate.
The design of U.S. commodity programs creates contingent on setting aside a percentage of the proeconomic incentives and conditions that result in gram base acres. Participation in the deficiency higher per-acre chemical use on commodity crops payment program is voluntary and therefore the than would occur under free-market conditions. In program needs to be sufficiently generous to inthis analysis, cross-sectional data from the 1991 duce participation. A consequence of the program and 1992 Cropping Practices Surveys are used to provisions is the creation of distortions in farm test for differences in chemical use in corn produc-production. These distortions are a source of the tion between participants in the feed grain program intensification of input use.
and nonparticipants (NASS/ERS). Corn is the
The distortions can be shown by comparing the most important U.S. crop in terms of chemical firm optimization decisions with and without farm use. Over half of all pesticides applied to field programs. Our illustrative model assumes a singlecrops are applied to corn, and more than 60 percent product firm using two variable inputs, land and of nitrogen fertilizer.
nonland, denoted A and X respectively. Output is produced by a neoclassical production function defined as F(A,X) with the usual properties, F i > 0 Background and Fii < 0, where i = A, X and subscripts denote derivatives. The firm maximizes profits in per-U.S. commodity programs are designed primarily fectly competitive product and factor markets. The to provide price and income protection for farmers, firm's maximization problem and optimality conto assure the nation an abundant and low-cost sup-ditions are:' ply of food and fiber (Langley et al). One justifi-X) cation for government intervention includes the= -perception that farmers are an economically hard -(2a) 7r A = pFA -= 0 pressed group that would be subject to intolerable instability in commodity markets without govern-(2b) x = pFx -w = 0 ment intervention (Langley et al) . Income support where p is the commodity price and v and w are the is achieved by government intervention in the mar-market prices of land (rental) and nonland inputs. ket to raise prices received by producers. Several From (2a) and (2b) the usual first-best efficiency mechanisms are used. For feedgrains a combina-condition is: tion of loan rates and target prices raise the effective market price a participant in the program can FA v expect to receive. To limit the accumulation of 3 -surplus stocks, deficiency payments are usually (x w where the marginal rate of substitution equals the price. The willingness-to-pay for land and nonland market factor price ratio. inputs are expressed as: The deficiency payment programs have been the primary income transfer mechanism in U.S. farm (7a) -policy. As such, it is the instrument through which (FA -0) most agricultural policy oriented distortions occur. The deficiency payment provisions also involve (7b) pFx = w cropland set-asides. Deficiency payments are the product of the deficiency rate and program produc-Equations (7a) -(7b) indicate that the first-best eftion. The deficiency rate is the difference between ficiency conditions are violated. The MRS/effecthe target price, p, and the higher of the five-month tive price ratio for this case is: weighted national average market price or the loan rate. (For brevity's sake we will assume that the (8) FA v market price is greater than the loan rate throughFx w(l-0) out the paper). The level of production used for calculating program payments is determined as the The user cost of land is increased because the marproduct of the program yield and allowable planted ket price v is divided by (1 -0). The increase in acres (base acres minus set-aside). Of course, if the user cost of land reflects the opportunity cost of the market price exceeds the target price, there is the set-aside requirement. For the producer that is no deficiency payment.
willing to participate in the program, the opportuOver the years the formula for calculating pro-nity cost of the set-aside is compensated at the gram payments has changed. Prior to 1981, defi-margin by the target price. The important point to ciency payments were based on proven yields and note is that the effective cost of the nonland input payment acres (base acres net of set-asides), where falls relative to the rental cost of land, resulting in proven yields are the average products of effective an intensification in the use of non-land inputs land in production. Noting that payment yields (chemicals, for example). were average products, the deficiency payment can
In the 1985 Farm Bill, in an attempt to reduce be expressed as, budget exposure and to reduce the direct incentive effects of deficiency payments on production, the
yield basis for payments was frozen at the average
2 It has been suggested that by fixing the payment yield, the distortionary effects indicating that payments were based on actual pro-of the program are eliminated. From the first order duction. Since deficiency payments were deter-conditions below we see that while the more overt mined by the payment yield (actual production) incentive effects have been reduced, distortions and acres, payment yields were endogenous. That still remain. The firm's optimization problem and is, producers had the direct incentive to increase first-order conditions are, yields and their payment rate by adjusting variable inputs, such as fertilizers and pesticides to enhance (9)
yields. In this case, the profit and first-order conditions are:
where y is the fixed program yield and 0 is thê
The MRS/effective price ratio for this case is expressed as, where 0 is the set-aside rate.
Assuming the target price, )p, exceeds the market price, the target price becomes the operational 
price. Another possible consequence of the programs The term on the left-hand-side is the willingness-are disincentives to adopt rotations. Program payto-pay for land or the marginal value product of ments are linked to the quantity of base acreage a land in production where value is determined by farmer maintains. The consequence of this is a loss the commodity market price. The willingness to of flexibility in cropping decisions (Reichelderfer pay for land is equal to the two components that and Phipps). Planting a different crop on program are on the right hand side. The first is the market base acreage, even if it is a part of a rotation, rental price of land which is reduced by the second results in the loss of the opportunity to collect fucomponent, the marginal deficiency payment. The ture deficiency payments. Rotations are an impormarginal deficiency payment is that component tant measure for breaking pest cycles and providwhich drives a wedge between the market price for ing carryover nitrogen. Failure to rotate could land services, v, and the effective price partici-therefore be linked to higher use of purchased
deficiency payment, or wedge, reduces the user Previous research has looked for program imcost of land, which again violates the Pareto tan-pacts on chemical use with time series data on gency conditions. Therefore, the program still cre-aggregate chemical expenditures or aggregate ates production distortions'. 3 chemical applications. In general, changes in The evolution of the deficiency payment chemical use patterns over time were evaluated in schemes over the past several decades has resulted relation to changes in commodity programs. in removing the direct incentive effects of having Osteen and Szmedra could not support an argupayments based directly on endogenous yields. Al-ment for the deficiency payment program having though the current deficiency payment is "decouan impact on pesticide use with the time-series data pled" from production in the sense that there are available in 1988. However, they argued, based on no endogenous variables within the deficiency non-statistical analysis, that target prices apparpayment calculation, it still distorts relative factor ently have little effect on pesticide use. Carlson (and commodity) prices. The current scheme also reported small but statistically significant increases provides indirect incentives or opportunities to in-in pesticide use in corn and cotton due to the 1981 crease the use of variable inputs by providing ad-farm program. Richardson found some evidence ditional income which reduces capital constraints that acreage restrictions increase pesticide use and increases the availability of credit. However, based on elasticities of substitution believed to apthe set-aside requirements limit producers' ability ply in the late 1960's. Offutt and Shoemaker, in to expand land inputs to the same degree as non-examining the impacts of technology and policies land inputs, therefore producers may use more over time on the share of land in the value of variable inputs per acre.
agricultural production, found that set-asides result The yield freeze was intended to be only tem-in an increase in the value share of land and a porary, for 2 years. The freeze initially had little subsequent increase in use of material inputs. affect on producers, since program yields always While the above studies were able to make some lagged behind expected actual yield (Hertel, Tsi-assessment on the possible impacts on commodity gas, and Preckel). However, as the freeze was programs on chemical use, the aggregate data did maintained beyond 2 years, and appeared to be-not allow a direct comparison of participants and come permanent, producer decisions should have nonparticipants, nor for evaluating those resource and technology factors that might also lead to differences in chemical application rates. A great
The introduction of normal flex in the 1990 Farm Bill has not many factors have to be accounted for in explainchanged the basic result. Normal flex reduces the acre payment rate by ing chemical expenditures or use over time, inthe normal flex rate, currently set a 15 percent. The normal flex reduces cluding changes in commodity programs, weather, the marginal deficiency payment by the flex acre rate, i.e., the marginal deficiency payment becomes, (T -p)y(l -6 -8), where 8 is the flex output and input prices, and chemical products on acre rate.
the market. The cross-section data available since 1990 makes it easier to directly compare program use of conservation tillage, and use of soil nutrient participants and nonparticipants, and virtually re-testing. duces the need to control for differences in prices.
Since cross-section data are being used to estiIn 1991 the loan rate for corn was $1.62, the mate the model, prices can be assumed to be the target price $2.75, and the set-aside requirement same for all producers. This leaves differences in 7.5 percent. Average market price over the 1991 chemical use to be explained by resource characcrop year was $2.37. In 1992 the loan rate was teristics, technology, and participation in the pro-$1.72, the target price $2.75, and the set-aside gram. requirement 5 percent. Average market price was $2.10. In both years, those who participated in the program received a deficiency payment and had to Data set aside a portion of their productive land.
The data for this analysis come from the 1991 and 1992 Cropping Practices Surveys conducted by Model NASS and ERS. The Cropping Practices Survey collects data on nutrient and pesticide usage and If program participants are applying chemicals .
other related practices on major field crops. The If program participants are applying chemicals more intensively than nonparticipants, then this survey does not represent the total U.S. acreage of more intensively than nonparticipants, then this should be revealed by their respective derived de-each crop, but does represent a major portion A mand functions for chemicals. Demand for chem-random sample of fields was selected for each crop icals for an individual producer can be defined as: so that the probability of selecting a particular field icals for an individual producer can be defined as: was directly proportional to the total acres planted
to that crop. Results from the survey can be used to make state-level estimates about each crop. The where:
surveys did not collect financial or production cost data. Xi = input use per acre For corn, the 17 major corn producing states = input prices containing 90 percent of the corn acres planted in 1991 and 1992 were surveyed. Over 5700 useable py = output price surveys were obtained in 1991, and over 5600 in 1992. Approximately seventy-percent of the fields Z i = yield-influencing factors related to the surveyed were enrolled in the feed grain program resource base and technology. each year. A simple comparison of participants and nonThe latter variables define such resource related participants revealed some important similarities factors such as climate, soil quality, and water and differences that tend to support the hypothesis availability. They also include technology-related that the participation in commodity programs refactors such as adoption of irrigation technology, sults in production intensification ( that differences are reported only if statistically ing land. One would therefore expect participants' different at the 5% level, using either Chi-square land to be of generally poorer quality than nonparor t test. Observations were weighted by the ticipants'. The higher amounts of crop residue left weighting factors provided by NASS. on fields operated by participants is further indicaFor both 1991 and 1992 participants were found tion of the greater erosivity of participants' land. to apply nitrogen and herbicides at greater rates than nonparticipants. Participants also seeded at a higher rate and used soil nutrient testing more fre-Nitrogen Use quently. Fields operated by participants were more likely to be irrigated, and less likely to have manure applied. Fields operated by participants were Nitrogen fertilizer was applied to 96 percent of the more likely to be labeled HEL by the SCS. There corn acreage in the states surveyed in 1991, and to was no difference in crop yields in 1991, but par-97 percent of the corn acreage in 1992. Particiticipants did have significantly higher yields in pants applied significantly more nitrogen per acre 1992. Significantly less of the corn acreage oper-than non-participants on corn grown for grain (as ated by participants was in a rotation, although opposed to seed, silage, or sweet corn) in each most participants did have corn in a rotation. . year, based on a two-tailed t-test of the difference The result on HEL supports the findings of in mean application rates (Table 2) . A state-byShoemaker that a deficiency payment is a subsidy state analysis has a similar result. Only in Georgia on land, and thus allows more marginal, less pro-in 1992 did non-participants apply significantly ductive land to be put into production, assuming more nitrogen than participants. that HEL is a measure of land quality. 4 Acreage Regression analysis was used to determine control provisions also favor enrollment of mar-whether program participation was a significant ginal land, as the opportunity cost of setting aside explanatory variable of the derived demand for nia portion of such land is less than for higher yield-trogen fertilizer. The derived demand function for nitrogen, with prices assumed to be constant across producers, was specified as: have a greater level of concern over the long-term increase the efficiency of impacts of their activities on the local environfertilizer application ment, including groundwater, and are therefore RESIDUE = percent of previous crop residue quicker to adopt more efficient chemical manageatplanting .ment practices (Lynne, Shonkwiler, and Rola). at a Owner-operators might also have more flexibility ROTATE = dummy variable form management practices legume was grown on the field than non-owners, who must often get approval in either of the previous two from the owner before making management years changes. TYPE = dummy variable for maturity About 3 percent of the fields surveyed were not length of corn (full or treated with nitrogen fertilizer, resulting in a data otherwise) set that is left censored around 0. The model was OWN = whether the field was owned by therefore estimated as a tobit. Each year was estithe operator mated separately because a likelihood ratio test in-HEL = whether the field was dicated that the data could not be pooled. designated as being highly A potential problem with any cross-section data edeiae asbin higy) set is heteroscedasticity. If left uncorrected, the erodible (soil quality) tobit models would be inefficient and inconsistent DRY = whether the state was affected (Maddala). Given the specification of the nitrogen by dry conditions at planting model, the only variable for which heteroscedastime.
ticity is expected to be a problem is TEST. One would expect that the application rates of those All variables but DRY were obtained from the-who conduct a soil test would have a smaller varicropping practices survey. DRY was based on the ance around the recommendation than those who Palmer drought index, and was obtained from do not have as good information about soil fertil-ERS. Participation, irrigation, HEL, residue, and ity. full season maturity were hypothesized to have a
The Goldfeld-Quandt test was used to test the positive influence on application rate. Irrigated ag-null hypothesis of homoscedasticity (Pindyck and riculture generally uses inputs more intensively, Rubinfeld). The data have a natural break around primarily because of higher yields. A field desig-the variable TEST, which is a dummy variable. nated HEL has higher erosion and runoff than The resulting F test could not reject the null hyfields without this designation. Higher runoff and pothesis, so no correction for heteroscedasticity erosion implies greater nutrient losses that must be was necessary. replaced through fertilizer applications. Higher
The estimated models are significant at the 1 residue left on the field results in cooler and wetter percent level. A goodness-of-fit test gave values soil conditions, and higher organic matter content between .09 and .11 (Table 4) .^ These values are in the soil. These condition result in less nitrogen being available for plant uptake (Duffy and Han-_______ thom). Full season corn has a longer growing seaGoodness of fit measure is sum of squared residuals divided by total low, even for cross-section data. Therefore, em-cide application rates are higher for program parphasis is placed on significant factors and unex-ticipants than for nonparticipants. pected insignificant variables. Most variables are Nationally, the application rate for participants significant at the 1 percent level and had the ex-was statistically greater than for nonparticipants at pected sign. There was a great deal of consistency the 1 percent level in both 1991 and 1992 (table 3) . between the two years.
In most states, participants applied herbicides at One interesting result is that using a soil nitro-greater rates than non-participants. Participants apgen test was associated with higher application plied at statistically greater rates in 6 states in 1991 rates. Three possible reasons for this are that the and 1992 (at the 5 percent level). recommendations based on the test were geared to A tobit model was specified to determine whethmaximizing yields, that the recommendations were er factors other than participation were the reason not followed by the farmer, or that farmers had for the differences in application rates. The followbeen underapplying nitrogen.
ing model was estimated: Program participation is positive and significant at the 1 percent level, even after accounting for the other factors. This result suggests that economic RATE = f(PART, IRR, CULT, RESIDUE, conditions created by the program increase fertil-ROTATE, TYPE, OWN, HEL) izer application rates on corn.
where Herbicides RATE = total herbicide application for 1992 crop year, in lbs of active Over 97 percent of fields surveyed were treated ingredient per acre. with at least one herbicide. Twenty-seven herbi-PART = dummy variable for cides were found to be used in corn production. An participation in feed grain analytic approach similar to the one used for nuprogram trients was carried out to test whether total herbi-IRR = dummy variable for whether field was irrigated CULT = number of times field was sum of squares. There is no commonly recognized goodness of fit measure for the tobit. cultivated for weed control Nitrogen and herbicide models estimated as a tobit. ***Significant at I percent level. **Significant at 5 percent level.
RESIDUE = percent of previous crop residue
The estimated models were significant at the 1 at planting percent level, with goodness-of-fit measures rang-ROTATE = dummy variable for whether ing between .12 and .14 (Table 4 ) Most variables any crop other than corn was were significant at the 1 percent level, and most grown in either of the previous variables had the expected sign. two years Participation had the expected positive effect on yeHEL =s whether thefieldwasherbicide application rates and was significant at HELi gn whether as . theiwas the 1 percent level in each year. Holding everydesgnated as beg highly thing else constant, participants applied more hererodible (soil quality) bicides per-acre than non-participants. OWN = whether the field was owned by the operator TYPE = dummy variable for early or Conclusions medium versus full season corn.
Commodity programs, in this case the feed grain program, appear to provide sufficient economic inParticipation, having an HEL designation, centives to producers to apply more nitrogen feramount residue, and having full season corn are tilizer and herbicides than non-participants. Even hypothesized to have positive effects on applica-after taking into account prices (by using crosstion rate. Assuming that the HEL designation is a section data) and all the technology/resource variproxy for soil quality, higher herbicide application ables available on the cropping practices survey, rates are required to assure that expected yields are participants were found to apply both nitrogen ferachieved. Leaving crop residue on fields increases tilizer and herbicides at higher rates than nonsoil moisture and reduces the number of cultiva-participants, indicating a greater intensity of protions, thus requiring greater reliance on herbicides duction. However, the exact cause or causes for to control weeds.
this apparent intensification of production cannot Rotations, ownership, irrigation, and cultivation be determined from the data. The higher applicawere hypothesized to have negative effects on ap-tion rates could be caused directly by the substituplication rate. Rotating crops with other crops tion of chemicals for land as a consequence of breaks pest cycles, thus reducing the amount of program set-aside requirements. While it is reasonpesticides required. Applying herbicides in irriga-able to assume that producers react to the market tion water increases efficiency, thereby minimiz-price because of the freeze on program yields, it is ing the amounts required. Cultivation is a mechan-possible that an expectation that the freeze will be ical means of weed control that is a substitute for lifted or that program yields will be adjusted are chemical controls.
incentives to maintain and officially record higher yields. A better understanding of the substitution general. The environmental problems that would between land and chemical inputs is needed in or-need to be addressed, the recommended farm mander to predict how set-aside requirements affect the agement practices, and the appropriate incentive use of chemical inputs. mechanisms for getting farmers to adopt improved The results indicate that those who rotate apply management practices would all have to be reexless chemicals, and program participants rotate amined if the structure of commodity programs is less frequently than nonparticipants. Even though greatly altered. most program participants do rotate corn (over 70%), the fact that nonparticipants use rotations to an even greater degree could be a factor in the References observed differences in chemical use. Planting flexibility options introduced in 1990, and likely to Capalbo, S.M., and T.T. Vo. "A Review of the Evidence on be continued or expanded in 1995, could reduce
